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Abstract 
The Chilean wine industry performed remarkably well over the 
past decades. Wines from Chile have found their way to consumers all 
over the world. This paper explores the factors that have supported the 
successful performance. In particular, through a questionnaire to key 
informants it tries to measure to what extent conscious collective 
action by local stakeholders to solve common problems of the industry 
in Chile and thereby create a shared basis for upgrading, have been 
relevant. 
The conclusion is that natural endowments, commercial and 
technological impulses from abroad and a favorable business climate 
do go a long way to explain past successes. It also concludes that these 
factors will not suffice to sustain continued success. The paper 
analyzes the issues that present collective action problems for the 
Chilean wine industry and assesses the capacity of local actors, their 
organizations and institutions to meet these challenges. 
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Introduction 
Over the past decade, the Chilean wine industry has shown a 
remarkable performance. Chile currently ranks 5th in the global league of 
wine exporting countries, ahead of countries like Germany, Portugal and 
the USA, satisfying 4.6% of global demand. 
In their explanations of this performance, some analysts emphasize 
external factors such as changes in the global wine market, whereas others 
point at particular strengths, both natural and man-made, of Chile and its 
wine producers. This paper explores to what extent regional clustering, 
including co-operation between firms and certain types of collective 
actions, played a part in shaping the Chilean wine industry’s success. We 
measure the quality of local cluster governance in the Chilean wine 
industry, to observe whether and how its recent export success and 
integration in global distribution systems stimulate joint action and local 
governance initiatives 
In other words, the central question underlying this case study is 
whether globalization stimulates cluster development or vice versa. 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter I clarifies the 
conceptual framework. Chapter II describes the regional structure and 
performance of the Chilean wine industry, considering also the role of 
foreign investors in the development of the industry. Chapter III 
summarizes competitive and strategic challenges for industry. Chapter IV 
deals with the quality of cluster governance, focusing on several themes 
in collective action: innovation, training & education, internationalisation, 
marketing and promotion, and infrastructure development. Chapter V 
deals with the development prospects of Chile’s wine industry. 
Chapter VI suggests implications for policy and draws conclusions.  
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I. Conceptual framework 
First we define key concepts central in current analyses of 
competitiveness: value chains, value systems, networks and clusters. In 
so doing, we explain why the focus of this paper is on issues of 
governance and collective action. Next, factors determining the quality 
of governance and the effectiveness of solutions to collective action 
problems in regional clusters are analysed. Together, the chapter 
provides a conceptual framework for the case study. 
A. Value chains, value systems, networks 
and clusters 
Value chains comprise firms that add value by manufacturing, 
marketing, and distributing goods or services towards final consumers 
(Nootebook and Klein-Woolthuis 2002). Manufacturing refers to the 
technical process of transforming inputs into output. Marketing refers 
to the art of selling goods, matching supply with demand, or vice 
versa. Distribution includes stabilisation activities —the logistic 
process of speeding up or slowing down flows of intermediate 
products (inventory control and warehousing)—, and transposition 
activities (transportation).  
Value systems in addition include actors providing strategic 
advice, financial, R&D and other services to the firms that are 
focused on manufacturing, marketing or distribution.   From a value 
chain or system perspective, individual firms are no longer the main 
source of competitiveness. Improving competitiveness requires fine- 
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tuning of the relations between firms involved in a value system, including exchanges and flows 
of goods, services, money, information, ideas, and knowledge. This is called ‘supply-chain 
management’ (SCM). 
Networks are different from value chains and systems. Networks may include actors from 
different value chains and systems, thus cross-cutting their borders. Networks often comprise actors 
who aim at exchanging ideas and knowledge so as to improve their respective business, e.g. co-
developing a new technology or a new product. The more complex and sensitive the purpose of a 
network, the smaller the number of participants, and the more selective these will be when forming 
the network (Nooteboom and Klein-Woolthuis 2002). 
Clusters, in turn, differ from networks. A cluster can comprise multiple value systems, and 
may, but need not, include inter-firm networks. Clusters thus comprise the vertical dimension of 
inter-firm relationships in value chains (often multiplying within the cluster due to increased 
specialisation, outsourcing and subcontracting), the horizontal and lateral dimension of inter-firm 
relationships in networks (which may develop insofar as transaction costs decrease due to 
clustering), and the diagonal dimension of linkages between value systems and networks (hence 
including connections between sub sectors and sectors).  
The cluster concept above all differs from value chains and networks, in that clustering 
processes often take place in a specific geographical and institutional setting. The clustering of 
firms may be in line with, or provide an answer to, region-specific sets of informal and formal ‘rules 
of the game’ (North 1994) that operate as ‘enabling constraints’ (Nooteboom 2000) for actors 
engaging in novel and thus seemingly risky developments. These actors need to share, to some 
extent, an institutional background, so as to align mental models, reduce risk perceptions at both 
sides of a (public-private, inter-firm or another) relation, enhance understandability in a setting of 
knowledge exchange, etcetera. We may also say that clustering of firms helps to solve governance 
problems.  
Another reason to conceptually separate clusters and networks is that they have 
complementary effects for competence: learning and innovation. Networking enhances the dynamic 
efficiency of innovation, by solving or reducing a series of dynamic market failures: cognitive lock-
in, dynamic uncertainty (Camagni 1991), specificity of investments in joint learning and innovation 
processes, and dynamic transaction costs (Nooteboom 2002). Geographical concentration enhances 
static and allocative efficiency, by mitigating a series of static market failures (incomplete 
information, static uncertainty, and information externalities), reducing transaction and logistic costs, 
and allowing for some external economies. Maskell (2001) argues that geographical concentration 
promotes learning through a fine-grained process of ‘variation, monitoring, comparison, selection 
and imitation of identified superior solutions’, but this refers to an evolutionary process of ‘first-
order’ learning: enhanced efficiency to perform existing practices. Networks, however, stimulate 
the critical communication activities of understanding and explanation, which support ‘second-order’ 
learning and innovation (Nooteboom 2000). In a specific type of regional clusters, e.g. Italianate 
industrial districts, these effects mingle, producing synergy between the knowledge effects of 
geographical concentration and networks. These clusters combine the best of both worlds. In other 
clusters, however, local and international network relationships do not develop. Here, the mere 
geographical concentration of firms may produce lock-in that can jeopardize, rather than stimulate, 
the competitiveness of firms (Visser and Boschma 2003). In line with this, Visser (2000) proposed 
the following definitions of networks and clusters: 
• Networks comprise strategic, purposeful, preferential, repetitive and co-operative 
interactions between business firms and other organizations, which may, but need 
not, operate in close vicinity.  
• Clusters are geographical concentrations of firms involved in the same, similar, or 
related activities, which may, but need not, co-operate with one another, e.g., in the 
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setting of ongoing specialisation, inter-firm division of labour, and mutual 
subcontracting.  
Only in the more developed clusters, actors interact with strategic purposes, co-operate, and 
learn to do so, institutionalising their collaborative efforts. In these cases, a local or regional support 
infrastructure may also develop (see figure 1). Hence, Cooke (in Nooteboom and Klein-Woolthuis 
2002) defines clusters as geographically proximate firms involved in vertical, horizontal, lateral or 
diagonal relationships, developing a localised support infrastructure and sharing a developmental 
vision, based on competition and co-operation in a specific market field’. 
Figure 1 
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effective governance will be required so as to increase investments in the long-term interest of all 
firms in a particular industry. 
A second reason for the importance of governance is that all individual firms are part of a 
value chain or system, while some may be involved in a network and/or regional cluster context. 
Global competition often means that firms, as parts of value chains, have to co-ordinate operations 
(SCM) so as to effectively compete with other chains. For the same reason, firms may develop 
external relations and network linkages or adopt a cluster approach to improve their 
competitiveness. All this requires learning to co-operate, finding ways to co-ordinate, and ensure an 
effective governance of joint actions and collective investments. 
The quality of governance differs across clusters. It depends on four variables: trust, leader 
firms, knowledge intermediaries, and solutions to collective action problems (see De Langen and 
Visser 2003, De Langen 2004, and figure 2). 
Figure 2 













Source: De Langen 2004 
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reduction of risks and transaction costs, and take cares of often difficult distribution issues 
associated with joint actions. 
Knowledge intermediaries, such as training centers, universities, R&D institutes, business 
associations and public agencies may also enable cooperation. On the one hand, they diffuse 
information that can enhance strategic insight and capabilities of firms, thus stimulating joint action. 
On the other hand, they may act as brokers in cluster coalitions.  
Finally, collective action problems (CAP’s) may arise in clusters. This is due to transaction 
costs and to the classic CAP of free riding, which arises in a setting of positive externalities 
(causing a difference between social and private costs and benefits) and non-excludability (of 
private agents not investing nor contributing). Solutions for these CAP’s require non-market co-
ordination (Olson, 1971), e.g. in a setting of business associations, public-private partnerships, 
alliances with R&D or training institutes, inter-firm networks focused on solving production or 
innovation problems, etcetera.  
These non-market coordination arrangements do not arise spontaneously, not even if the 
benefits exceed costs for all and every member of a business community. Reducing transaction 
costs and free riding requires the earlier mentioned mechanisms of trust, associations, leader firms, 
and knowledge intermediaries, along with a legitimate community argument and an effective use of 
‘voice’ by individual firms (cf. Hirschman 1971). A community argument convinces decision-
makers in a certain industry or region to contribute to a collective action with a view to shared 
problems within the community. Such an argument is often strategic in nature, and unifies actors 
belonging to the community. Voice is exerted by individual firms that are not happy with the lack 
or quality of a solution to a CAP. 
In a situation where the above variables lead to a low quality of governance, collective 
problems may not be solved, e.g. in the areas of innovation (products, processes, organization, 
services), training & education, internationalization (geographical spread and penetration of final 
markets), marketing & promotion (collective and individual, in line with the purchasing decision of 
consumers), and infrastructure (external to the firm, physical and digital). Hence, an industry or 
cluster may decline. 
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II.  Structure and performance of the 
Chilean wine industry 
Chile has a long history in winemaking. In 1551, a Spanish 
conqueror managed to make wine at a location 500 kilometers north of 
Santiago. During the colonial period, wine was made for religious 
purposes. In the 18th and 19th century, rich families in Chile made wine 
imitating French Chateaux and thus importing classical grape varieties 
and technology from France. The outbreak of Phylloxera in Europe at 
the end of the 19th century stimulated the export of quality wines. In 
the 20th century, wine production slowed down, as import-substitution 
policies did not favor exports and wine-makers depended on a small 
domestic market. In the 1980s, changes in macroeconomic policies and 
national law joined crucial developments in the domestic and 
international wine markets, boosting vineyard area, wine production 
and exports in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
A. Planted area 
The area planted with vines in Chile was decreasing before 1995 
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Table 1 
EVOLUTION OF VINE AREA IN CHILE 1985-2001 
(Hectares) 
Year Grapes for wine 
1985 67 132 
1990 65 202 
1995 54 393 
1996 56 003 
1997 63 550 
1998 75 388 
1999 85 357 
2000 103 876 
2001 106 971 
Source: SAG 2003. 
It takes about three years before new vines are in production, so the growth of wine 
production is likely to increase at least until 2004, as a result of the accelerating increase of the 
planted area in 1999/2000. In international perspective, only China and Australia surpass Chile 
regarding the speed of increase in the vineyard area during 1995-2000, with a 57 and 73% 
respectively (Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). 
Despite the fast increase of the vineyard area after 1995, Chile ranks 11th in the world on this 
count  (ibid.), holding a share of 1.3% in 2001. Spain is first on the list, with a 15.5% share of the 
global vineyard area. France (11.9%), Italy (11.5%), Turkey (6.7%), and USA (5.2%) follow, while 
Argentina had a 2.6 % share in 2001. 
The industry’s main focus is red vines. Important grape varieties are Cabernet Sauvignon and 
Merlot. Syrah and Carmenère are relatively new additions to chilean wine. The planted area of these 
four wine grape varieties increased considerably (table 2). The Carmenère grapes will continue to 
increase in importance during the following years, as this variety disappeared in Europe (where it 
comes from), due to the world wars and several plagues. At the moment, Chilean wine producers 
aim at expanding Carmenère production, branding it as a typical Chilean vine, like Shiraz reds for 
Australia or Malbec for Argentina. 
Table 2 
EVOLUTION OF VINEYARD AREA IN CHILE 1996-2001 
Annual evolution of acreage Annual change (%) 
Variety 1996 1997 1889 1999 2000 2001 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 
Cabernet 
Sauvignon 
13 094 15 995 21 094 26 172 35 967 38 227 22.1 31.8 24.1 37.4 6.2 
Merlot 3 234 5 411 8 414 10 261 12 824 12 887 67.3 55.5 22.0 25.0 0.49 
Chardonnay 4 503 5 563 6 705 6 907 7 672 7 567 23.5 20.5 3.0 11.1 (1.36) 
Sauvignon 
blanc 6 172 6 576 6 756 6 564 6 790 6 673 6.5 2.7 -2.8 3.4 (1.72) 
Chanin blanc     93 98 104 95 76 49 5.4 6.1 -8.7 -20.0 (35) 
Pinot Noir   287 411 589 839 1 613 1 450 43.2 43.3 42.4 92.3 -10.1 
Riesling   317 338 348 286 286 286 6.6 2.9 -17.8 0.0 0.0 
Semilión 2 616 2 427 2 425 2 355 1 892 1 860 -7.2 -0.08 -2.9 -19.7 -1.7 
País 15 280 15 241 15 442 15 457 15 179 15 070 -0.2 1.3 0.1 -1.8 -0.7 
Carmenere  330 1 167 2 306 4 719 5 407  253.6 97.6 104.6 14.5 
Syrah      19 201 568 1 019 2 039 2 197 957.9 182.6 79.4 100.1 7.7 
Cabernet Franc        17 64 138 316 689 823 276.5 115.6 129 118.0 19.4 
Source: SAG, 2003 
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B. Production 
As a result of the fastly increasing vineyard area in Chile since 1995, wine production also 
increased during much of the 1990s. Volume more than tripled in ten years time, comparing 1992 
with 2003 (see figure 3). During the same period, the world’s wine production grew 3.3% 
(Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). Countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Japan and China more than 
doubled production during this period (ibid.). 
Figure 3 
EVOLUTION OF CHILEAN WINE PRODUCTION 1991-2003 











Source: SAG 2003 
 
 
One may observe that the level of production reached in Chile by the end of the 20th century 
was about the same as those prevailing at the end of the 1970s, before it started declining 
throughout the 1980s due to falling domestic demand (Agosin et al. 2000). Production growth in the 
1990s is closely linked with increasing foreign demand for Chilean wines, however, which makes it 
notable, as it must have gone hand in hand with changes in technology, production, marketing and 
distribution so as to supply a coherent product matching prevailing trends in retailing and consumer 
demand in importing countries. 
Despite the fast increase of production during the 1990s, Chile is still a relatively small 
player; with a 2.1% share in global wine production (in volume terms). This score gives the country 
the 11th rank on the list of the world’s largest wine producers. France (19.9%), Italy (19%), Spain 
(11.4%), the USA (7.4%), Argentina (5.9%), Australia (3.8%), Germany (3.4%), Portugal (2.9%) 
and South Africa (2.4%) all have a higher share than Chile in the global volume of wine production. 
Of these countries, France, Spain and Italy are traditional producers, involved in the production of 
wine for centuries. They are still dominant in volume terms, but newcomers such as the USA, 
Argentina, Australia, South Africa and Chile are trying to close the gap. Australia’s market share in 
the UK, for instance, is currently approaching that of France (Heijbroek 2003) or already surpassed 
it (Coelho 2003). 
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Grape production for wine is concentrated in the central regions of Chile (table 3 and figure 
41 and wine-producing valleys within these regions).  
This is above all due to the favorable climate and availability of appropriate soils in these 
regions. A Chilean association of wine producers describes Chile’s natural advantages as follows: 
“the Mediterranean climate in Chile prevails longitudinally from the tip of the Andes Range and the 
valleys of the Coastal Range. Summers are often hot, with no clouds and low atmospheric humidity, 
which favors full ripeness of the grape (…). Winter sees successive weather fronts providing large 
amounts of rain and a mild drop in temperatures. Periodic waves of cool temperatures normally 
only appear while the vine is in its dormant phase” (Chilevid 2003). The south north passing of the 
Humboldt current also helps to explain the regional structure of wine production in Chile. In the 
central regions, this current prevents rain and generates refreshing winds during summertime. Clear 
skies and high solar radiation also contribute, causing temperature variations of up to 70°F, which 
favors the concentration of color, aroma and flavor in the resulting wine (ibid). 
Table 3 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VINE ACREAGE 
(Hectares) 
Regions Total vine acreage % of Total 
Maule 46 400  43.4 
L.B. O’Higgins 29 809  27.9 
Biobío 13 662  12.8 
Metropolitana 10 063    9.4 
Valparaíso 4 965   4.6 
Coquimbo 2 067   1.9 
Other regions (7)  5    0 
Total national 106 971  100 
Source: Nuevos Mundos 2002. 
Table 3 shows that the Maule and the Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins regions include 72% of 
the planted surface. Figure 4 shows that these two regions are also dominant in terms of production 
volume. These are administrative regions, however. Considering the distribution of wine grape 
activity at the level of valleys, we find that the Maule valley (covering the central and South of the 
Maule region), the Colchagua valley (in the L.B. O’Higgins region), the Curicó valley (in the 
Northern part of the Maule region, bordering L.B. O’Higgins), the Biobío & Itata valley (in the 
Bíobío region), the Maipo valley (in the Metropolitan region), and the Cachapoal valley (also in 
L.B. O’Higgins) are good for 95% of the total vine acreage (see figure 5). Some of these valleys 
appear to specialise in wine making, at the expense of other economic activities (oral 
communication 20 Sept. 2003). 
                                                     
1  Chile uses a political-administrative structure with 13 regions, numbered from Region 1 in the North to Region 12 in the South, plus 
an unnumbered Metropolitan Region comprising Santiago and surroundings. 
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Figure 4 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION IN 2002 AND 2003 











Source: SAG 2003. 
 
Figure 5 










Source: Ben Allouch 2003. 
The Colchagua and Cachapoal valley together constitute an official "denominación de 
origen" (DO, certificate of origin) with the name ‘Rapel Valley’. The Maipo Valley also has a DO, 
while it includes relatively old, large and export-oriented wineries such as Concha & Toro, San 
Pedro, Santa Rita, Santa Carolina and Undurraga, along with a few small, quality-focused wineries 
selling wines at relatively high export prices (e.g. Almaviva, El Principal, Antiyal, and Quebrada de 
Macul). The Colchagua valley appears to agglomerate relatively new, small, quality-focused and 
export-oriented wineries, such as Casa Lapostolle, Montes, and Errázuriz. The Casablanca valley is 
specialized in the production of white wine, which some wineries (e.g. Villard and again Casa 
Lapostolle) sell at above-average prices. 
On the whole, wine grape production in Chile takes place in a territory covering about one 
third of the nation. In this setting, the 7th region (Maule) and 6th region (L.B. O’Higgins) are 
dominant, in terms of planted area and production volume, while a few valleys seem to specialize in 
wine making, with Casablanca focusing on white wines, and Maipo and Colchagua lodging an 
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course, wineries may have various establishments (vineyards, bodegas and offices, e.g. for 
marketing, administration or strategic activities) at different locations. For example, Chile’s largest 
wine exporter Concha & Toro has vineyards in Casablanca, Rapel, Maipo, Maule and Curicó, as 
well as offices in Santiago. Firms select locations for different activities according to their 
marketing, production and/or logistic strategies. It appears that Santiago, the capital city of Chile, 
agglomerates marketing, administrative and strategic decision-making functions in the Chilean wine 
industry. Twenty-five of the twenty-eight experts interviewed in the setting of our empirical work 
(see section 5), are located in this city, where we find several national wine associations, specialized 
university research institutes, public agencies involved in the wine industry, and other relevant 
actors. Of course, Santiago may well concentrate a few key activities within the wine cluster, but as 
part of its overall function as a capital city fulfilling various social, economic, strategic, public and 
political functions for different sectors and groups. 
D. Exports 
Chile’s wine industry is an example of an effective turnaround from a focus on domestic 
towards export markets. Several indicators can be used to sustain this point, e.g. the share of wine 
sold abroad; export sales volume, value, and share in global markets; the geographical 
diversification and penetration of markets; and the number and location of exporting firms. 
The share of Chilean wines sold abroad increased from 7% in 1989 to 63% in 2002. In 
volume terms, only 8,000 hectoliters were exported in 1984, a figure rising to 185 thousand in 
1988, and then accelerating throughout the 1990s, so that in 2002, more than 3.5 million hectoliters 
of Chilean wine found their way to the world market. This is the fastest growth recorded for New 
World wine producers during the period under review (Coelho 2003). With this, Chile’s share in 
global wine export volume rose from about zero in 1984 to over 4% in 2000. Export value rose 
from a meager 10 million US-dollars (FOB) in 1984, to 145 million US-dollars (FOB) in 1994 and 
a dazzling 602 million US-dollars (FOB) in 2002 (figure 6).  
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Figure 6 
CHILEAN WINE EXPORTS IN VOLUME (1000 HECTOLITERS, DARK GREEN BARS), VALUE (CURRENT 





















































The turnaround of the Chilean wine industry has been supported by an increase in sales 
abroad of bottled wine, which in 2002 were good for 58% of the total volume of wine exports and 
87% of its value (Ben Allouch 2003). According to SAG (2003), wine with a denomination of 
origin is also supportive of the good export performance of the Chilean wine industry. Wine with a 
DO accounted for about 80% of the total volume of production in 2002 and 2003 (January-August), 
while the tendency seems to be on the rise. 
From a global perspective, Chile ranked 13th in the world league of wine-exporting countries 
in 1986. In 2000, however, it stood at the 5th place, surpassing the traditional wine exporters 
Germany and Portugal along with new wine-exporting countries like the USA (table 4). Ranking 
11th on the list of the world’s largest wine producers, the degree of internationalization of the 
Chilean wine industry is the highest in the world, amounting to 45.5% during 1996-98, against a 
global average of 2.3 % (Coelho 2003).  
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Table 4 
EXPORT SHARE IN VALUE OF THE MAIN EXPORTING COUNTRIES IN 1986 AND 2000 
(percentage) 
Country 1986 Country 2000 
France 51.17 France 40.93 
Italy 19.83 Italy 18.64 
Spain 8.24 Spain 9.56 
Germany 7.89 Australia 7.13 
Portugal 5.49 Chile 4.56 
Greece 0.89 USA 4.52 
Yugoslavia 0.72 Portugal 3.50 
Belgium & Luxemburg 0.70 Germany 3.15 
The United States 0.63 Argentina 1.15 
Australia 0.54 South Africa 1.01 
Hungry 0.39 New Zealand 0.73 
Bulgaria 0.32 The United Kingdom 0.69 
hile 0.28 Bulgaria 0.54 
Source: Buitelaar, in Ben Allouch 2003. 
In a setting of an increasing number of wine-exporting countries—from 49 in 1988 to 105 in 
2001 (Ben Allouch 2003), the world’s largest wine exporter France significantly lost market share, 
while the position of Germany, Portugal and Italy also weakened. Gains in market share have been 
especially large for Australia (which was even absent on the 1986 list), Chile and the USA, and, to a 
lesser extent, Argentina, South Africa and New Zealand. 
The Chilean wine industry managed to diversify its exports to different geographical markets. 
In 1980, Latin America still absorbed 88% of Chilean wine export, but this figure dropped to 8% in 
2002 (figure 7). 
Figure 7 












Throughout the 1980s, the USA, Canada and Mexico became Chile’s main buyers. Sales to 
the USA, Canada and Mexico peaked in 1990 at 44% of total exports, after which this figure started 
decreasing due to the fact that in the 1990s, European importers took over, absorbing more than 
50% of Chilean wine in 2002. More recently, Chilean wineries have started to export to Asian-
Oceanic countries, whose share increased from 3% in 1995 to 12% in 2002. On the whole, the 
number of buyer countries rose from 36 to 96 between 1984 and 1999 (Agosin et al. 2000). At the 
level of individual countries, the USA and the UK are the principal markets for Chilean wine 
exports. In terms of volume, the UK was most important in 2002; in terms of sales value, the USA 
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Table 5 
DESTINATION OF CHILEAN WINE IN 2002 
(Millions of US dollars and liters) 
Country Millions of US 
dollars 
Millions de liters 
USA 130.40 54.80 
Great Britain 117.90 60.20 
Canada 37.80 32.80 
Denmark 31.00 25.30 
Germany 30.00 25.30 
Japan 28.70 12.50 
Ireland 26.70 9.00 
Sweden 25.40 12.70 
Netherlands 20.70 9.50 
Source: SAG 2003. 
Table 5 also shows that in some countries (Canada, Denmark, Germany), the relation 
between volume and value is almost 1 to 1, whereas in Japan, Ireland, Sweden, The Netherlands 
and the important US and UK markets, there is a 1 to 2 (or even 3) relation between volume and 
sales. Table 6 shows the evolution of average sale prices per market in the period of 1995-2001. 
 
Table 6 
EVOLUTION OF THE AVERAGE PRICES IN THE MAIN EXPORT MARKETS 
 (in US $ FOB/liter) 
(percentage) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
USA 1.69 1.65 1.91 2.17 2.34 2.28 2.43 
Great Britain 1.88 1.83 2.14 2.32 2.43 2.34 2.07 
Canada 0.83 1.04 1.32 1.52 1.61 1.50 1.22 
Germany 2.52 2.36 2.33 2.22 2.05 1.89 1.43 
Denmark 1.78 1.55 1.73 1.99 2.09 1.88 1.41 
Japan 0.91 1.77 2.48 2.78 2.78 2.75 2.60 
Source: Nuevos Mundos 2002. 
 
In most countries except Germany, average prices increased until 1999, and then stabilized or 
even started falling. Despite the short period of observation (7 years), this fact has not gone 
unnoticed among Chilean wine exporters. The idea is that sale prices in popular and premium 
segments of the market will fall due to fierce competition related with a surplus of investment and 
supply during much of the 1990s in various countries. 
Wineries realizing a relatively high sale price for export wines produced in Chile have in 
common their location, production strategy (small quantities of high-quality wines), and ownership 
(foreign involvement). Almaviva, El Principal, Antiyal, and Quebrada de Macul are 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 
4th on a ranking of wineries by export sale price, and all produce these wines in the Maipo valley. 
The other six of the top-10 list of firms selling expensive in export markets can be found in the 
Casablanca, Rapel, Maule and Malleco valleys. On the basis of a count of the most traditional 
vineyard of exporting firms, five valleys lodge 78% of the total. These are the Maule, Colchagua, 
Curicó, Maipo and Cachapoal valleys (table 7). 
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Table 7 
LOCATION OF EXPORTING WINERIES IN CHILE, 2001 
Valley Number of 
wineries 
Percent 
1.  Maipo 27 20,6 
2. Colchagua 25 19,1 
3.  Curicó 21 16,0 
4.  Maule 16 12,2 
5. Cachapoal 13 9,9 
6.  Casablanca 8 6,1 
7.  Other valleys (6) 29 25,1 
Total 131 100,0 
Source: Chilevid, 2003. 
E. Industry structure 
In the 1990s, growing demand for New World and Chilean wines attracted newcomers to the 
Chilean wine industry. Hence, the total number of wineries recently increased as from 1990, 
reversing a 20 year old trend of decline. The number of exporting wineries equally increased. 
Precise figures regarding the total number of firms and the number of exporting wineries are not 
available, due to methodological problems; different institutes follow different count rules, making 
that the available data for different periods are incomparable, while they sometimes have to be 
taken as proxies for the abovementioned numbers. Yet, the available data suggest a fast increase in 
both the total number of firms, and the number of exporting wineries, which may have intensified 
local competition. 
Another factor of importance to domestic competition is the degree of industry concentration. 
In 2001, the four largest wineries in Chile in terms of export value, contributed 33% to total chilean 
wine exports (figure 8). These firms were Concha y Toro (14.2%), San Pedro (10.7%), Santa Rita 
(4.7%) and Santa Carolina (3.9%). Considering the consolidated group figures of these firms, their 
share was found to be even larger: 45% (Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). 
Figure 8 
STRUCTURE OF THE CHILEAN WINE INDUSTRY, BY EXPORT 

















Source: Nuevos Mundos 2002 
Note: the precise figures for Concha y Toro, San Pedro, Santa Rita and Santa 
Carolina are in the text. For Santa Emiliana, the score was 3.88%; for 
Caliterra: 3.03%; for Santa Ines: 2.61%; for Undurraga: 2.52%; for Errázuriz: 
2.37%; and for Valdivieso: 2.21% 
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The Chilean wine industry is less fragmented than in Europe (France, Spain and Italy), 
comparable with that of Argentina, and more fragmented than the wine industries of Australia and 
the USA. In Europe, the combined export value market share of the top 4 (consolidated group 
figures) is lower than 20%. In Australia and the USA, the combined export value market share of 
the top 4 (consolidated group figures) in 2002 was about 60% in both countries (ibid).  
 Despite the more fragmented European market, the average turnover of the largest European 
winemakers is higher than the Chilean top 4. In fact, the Chilean giant Concha y Toro—with total 
revenue of 152 million US dollars in 2002, only occupies the 30th place on the global list of leading 
wine companies, excluding traders (Heijbroek and Rubio, 2003). Table 8 shows that French, USA, 
German and Australian companies dominate the world wine business. This is surprising in the case 
of German, Australian and US companies, as in 2001 their countries of origin held a 3.7 (Germany), 
3.8 (Australia) and 7.4 (USA) per cent share in global volume, against a 20% share for France. At 
the global level, horizontal concentration (through mergers and takeovers) and vertical integration 
(of primary and secondary production, along with marketing and distribution) appears to be the 
trend as from the 1980s (Coelho 2003), when New World wine producing countries starting 
roaring. Yet, the global wine industry remains characterized by fragmentation, despite this trend and 
the presence of a few giants. The largest three wine companies in the world only account for 7% of 
global output, while this is about 25% in the beer and spirits industry (ibid).  
Table 8 
THE WORLD’S LARGEST WINEMAKERS IN 1998, IN TERMS OF TURNOVER 
(Million of US dollars) 
Company name Origin Turnover 
LVMH France 1 462 
E&J Gallo United Stales 1 428 
Seagram Canada 800 
Castel Freres France 700 
Canandalgua United States 614 
Henkell & Sohnlein Germany 521 
Reh Gruppe Germany 500 
Diageo United Kingdom 500 
Wein International Germany 480 
The Wine Group United States 426 
Val d´Örbieu France 400 
Grands Chais de France France 390 
Southcrop Australia 376 
R. Mondavi United States 325 
Freixenet Spain 318 
BRL Hardy Ltd. Australia 292 
Beringer Wine Estates United States 260 
Mildara Blass Australia 260 
Brown-Forman United States 260 
Pernord Ricard France 250 
Source: The Economist 1999 
 
F. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
The Chilean wine industry attracted foreign investors due to unique climate and soil 
characteristics, a regulatory framework warranting the availability of (new) land, a low disease 
burden, relatively low labor, land and real estate costs, and a stable macroeconomic environment. 
The arrival in 1980 of the Spanish wine maker Miguel Torres is considered to have had a significant 
impact on local wine makers, both in technological (e.g. introduction of stainless steel tanks) and 
commercial (exports) aspects. During the 1980s and especially the 1990s, other foreign companies 
followed suit, investing directly in the creation of own vineyards or in Chilean companies (see table 
9), or setting up joint ventures with a Chilean company (table 10). 
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Table 9 
 DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE CHILEAN WINE INDUSTRY 1974-1998  
(Thousands of US $) 
Company name Origin Turnover 
HAC Investment Ltd. United States 16 700 
Marnier Investissement S.A. France 5 559 
The Robert Mondavi Corp y R.M.E. Inc. USA 5 925 
Les Domaines Barons de Rothschild USA 5 925 
European Wine Company B.V. Netherlands 2 411 
Miguel Torre Carbó y otros Spain 2 107 
Baron Phillippe de Rothschild S.A. France 1 989 
C.N. Mariani y otros USA 2 352 
Magnota Winery Corp Canada 1 277 
Stimson Lane Ltd./Int. Wines & Spirits Ltd. USA 1 066 
Other various 7 224 
Total  50 135 
Source: Agosin et al. 2000 
 
Table 10 
JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN CHILEAN AND FOREIGN WINERIES (1974-1998) 
Name of the joint-venture Names of the foreign/Chilean parts Country 
Almaviva B. Phillipe de Rothschild-Mouton / Concha y Toro France 
Aquitania F. Solminihac / B. Prats, P. Pontallier France 
Caliterra Robert Mondavi / Viña Errázuriz USA 
Casa Lapostolle Marnier Lapostolle / Rabat family France 
Dallas Conte Mildara Blass / Santa Carolina Australia 
De Larose Larose Trintaudon/ AGF/ Familia Granella France 
Los Vascos B. Phillipe de Rothschild-Lafite/ Viña Santa Rita France 
Mapocho BRL Hardy / Viña Cánepa USA 
Veramonte Franciscan State/ A. Huneeus USA 
Villard Estate Thierry Villard/ Santa Emilliana France 
Willian Févre W. Fèvre/ Victor Pino France 
Source: Agosin et al. 2000 
During 1974-1989, investment through joint ventures amounted to 5 million dollars; between 
1990-94, this increased to 8 million, after which the figure accelerates to 38 million  
US dollars during 1995-98. Between 1974 and 1998, investments by foreign companies in own 
vineyards or Chilean companies amounted to 50.1 million -dollars. Hence, total foreign investment 
in the Chilean wine industry during the period under review amounts to 101 million -dollars. USA 
investors account for more than 50 % of investments, with French and Canadian investors also 
being important (Agosin et al. 2000).  Recent figures for 1999-2001 suggest that foreign 
investments are leveling off (Ben Allouch 2003). 
Besides financial resources, foreign investors also bring along technical expertise, marketing 
know-how, consumer market information, prestige, and scale economies (e.g. in distribution costs). 
This appears to have had a positive impact on the Chilean wine industry. Wineries with foreign 
involvement were among the first to export to a wide range of markets. In 2002, they took care of 
15% of the export value of Chilean wines, and 12 % of the total export volume. They also served as 
an example for local, often relatively small and young wineries, thus promoting the 
internationalization of the Chilean wine industry. 
CEPAL - SERIE Desarrollo productivo  N°156   
27 
III. Competitive and strategic 
challenges 
The Chilean wine industry fared well over the past two decades: 
“a story of tremendous success with an unprecedented turnaround” 
(Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). The rise in export has been sustained by 
enhanced sales of bottled wine. Until 1999, per unit sale prices have 
been increasing, albeit not as fast as in other countries (Ben Allouch 
2003). Recently, however, unit sale prices tend to stabilize and 
evenfall, while sales of bottled wines are also under pressure, due to 
excess supply in the world market for popular premium and premium 
wines (Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). Yet, the acceleration in planted 
surface in Chile and the 3-year delayed supply response implies that 
exports of Chilean wines will have to increase with 65% over the 
period 2003-05 (Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). How to reconcile falling 
prices and increasing output in Chile, against a background of: a) a 
growing global excess supply, especially in lower market segments, b) 
falling worldwide consumption of wine (minus 7,8% comparing 1996-
98 with 1986-1990; Coelho 1993), c) shifting consumer demand, 
which traditionally is highly diversified across countries and regions, 
but currently tends to emphasize value for money, novelty, clarity, 
along with simple and transparent product characteristics (which in 
turn is related with the supermarket-led ‘democratization’ of wine 
consumption), d) increasing retail power, e) the rising importance of 
branding, f) enhanced investments in marketing, g) horizontal 
concentration (through mergers and takeovers) in the global wine 
industry, inducing economies of scale in distribution and of scope in 
production, h) vertical integration (from the primary production of 
excellent grapes to the marketing task of offering a distinguishable  
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product and the logistic task of bridging  ‘the last and most difficult  mile’  to spatially flexible on-
trade wine consumption, i) large MNOs competing and co-operating so as to increase their share in 
still growing markets, and j) a constructive role of governments elsewhere strategically investing or 
helping  to  coordinate  investments  in  the  industry,    e.g. in  R&D  and/or training (Heijbroek 
2003, Heijbroek and Rubio 2003, Coelho 2003, Anderson, Norman and Wittwer 2001)? The task in 
this paper is not to provide an answer to this complex question. Strategy development is the 
industry’s responsibility. We refer to other studies in this area (see the above references). One quote 
specifies the key strategic issue at stake, however: 
“Chile has been very successful in the international markets, with decent New World wines at 
reasonable prices and a few strong international brands. However, its limitations are starting to 
catch up. Known in particular as a reliable supplier of basic and premium wines, Chile is finding it 
hard to break away from this image. If competitors become more innovative in content and 
branding, many brands from Chile run the risk of becoming ‘tired’, in particular because there is too 
little distinction amongst the wines” (Heijbroek 2003). 
Our fieldwork indicates that currently, a number of actors in the industry work hard to clarify 
issues, set an agenda for a strategic discussion, provide an answer to the above question, and 
implement a collective strategy to develop the industry. Our task is to measure the quality of 
governance of any of the joint actions and collective investments specified in this process to solve 
current competitive problems of the Chilean wine industry. Below, we present the views of industry 
experts regarding the nature of these problems, collective action requirements, collective action 
problems (CAPs), and ways of solving CAPs in the Chilean wine industry. 
A final clarification regarding the nature of our work is that we part from a cluster 
perspective (see section 2), and focus on various network and collective action initiatives in the 
cluster. We do so at the subnational level, as wine production in Chile extends across a vast territory 
(one-third) of the country, which suggests that neighborhood effects (e.g. easier coordination of 
inter-firm division of labor, or Maskell’s first-order learning effects of geographical concentration) 
are less important. For an analysis of this type of clustering effects, we refer to the work-in-progress 
by Ben Allouch (2003)—on the organization of production at the firm and inter-firm level, and by 
Giuliani (2003)—on knowledge sharing at the local level (in the Colchagua valley). Our works 
focuses on the question whether a mix of formal and informal ‘enabling constraints’ develops in the 
Chilean wine cluster, so that actors can engage in strategic but risky ventures that produce second-
order learning effects (annex 2). Such would complement the natural resource based advantages of 
Chile’s wine industry. 
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IV.  Importance and quality of 
cluster governance 
During September and October 2003, we interviewed 28 key 
experts involved in the governance of the chilean wine cluster (annex 
1). Only one expert was not involved in cluster governance. The 
experts were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the Chilean 
wine industry, the organizations (associations, public institutes, 
universities) or (large, leader, small, and foreign) firms they represent, 
their position in these organizations or firms, or a recommendation by 
other experts (condition: a minimum of two independent 
recommendations). During the interview, we clarified, whenever 
necessary, the concepts used in different questions, ensuring that the 
nature and intention of the questions were clear to respondents. We 
asked them to provide answers to a set of structured questions, but also 
and explicitly requested additional explanations—views and opinions. 
Hence, we collected both quantitative and qualitative information—
important for the later process of sense making of data. The 
interviewing was done face to face (except for three respondents at 
remote locations from Santiago: Talca, Casablanca, and London, who 
received the questionnaire by e-mail and replied by fax).
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A. Importance of issues restraining competitiveness and the 
relevance of collective action problems (CAPs) in each issue 
We first discussed with the experts five areas where currently problems may restrain the 
competitiveness of the Chilean wine industry: innovation, education & training, 
internationalization, marketing and promotion, and infrastructure (section 2). Next, the experts 
determined the relevance of CAPs in each area. Table 11 summarizes the findings. 
Table 11 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FIVE ISSUES CURRENTLY RESTRAINING THE COMPETITIVENESS  
OF THE CHILEAN WINE INDUSTRY, AND RELEVANCE OF CAPS IN EACH AREA 
Relative importance of problems 
in this area 
Relevance of CAPs? Issue 
Mean SD YES NO 
Innovation 4.61 0.63 17 11 
Education and training 4.43 0.63 15 13 
Internalization 4.54 1.00 22 6 
Marketing and promotion 4.75  0.59 23 5 
Infrastructure 3.46  1.04 10  18 
Source: survey September-October 2003 
Notes: a) relative importance was measured on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important); b) *: 
problems in this area are less significant than in other areas (paired t-test); c) **: CAPs in this area are less 
significant than in other areas (paired t-test); d) ***: problems in this area are also more significant than in 
education & training. 
 
Table 11 shows, in order of importance, that marketing & promotion, innovation, 
internationalization, and education & training are areas where specific problems currently restrain 
the competitiveness of the industry, and have to be solved, through private, collective, public, or 
public-private interaction. Infrastructure is considered a significantly less important area, although 
opinions seem to differ in this respect (see the relatively high SD). The table also shows that CAPs 
are especially relevant in marketing & promotion and internationalization, and to a lesser extent in 
innovation, education & training, and, once again, infrastructure. The number of experts 
considering that CAPs are not relevant in the problem area is high compared with measurements in 
other clusters (De Langen and Visser 2003, De Langen 2004). This may mean that experts in the 
Chilean wine industry either consider a lesser need to co-operate to solve the respective problems, 
or that they consider that CAPs are not so much of an obstacle. We carefully guided respondents in 
the process of, firstly, analyzing the nature of the problem, secondly, answering to what extent its 
solution requires joint (private-private or private-public) action, and thirdly, whether CAPs 
obstaculize such joint action. Below, we present the additional qualitative information of 
respondents concerning their answers. 
In the area of marketing and promotion, the current image of Chile as a low-cost producer of 
‘nice wines’ for popular premium and premium market segments is increasingly felt as a constraint 
to the future growth of the industry. The need is felt to build up a ‘brand of Chile’, so that some 
wineries may move up the stairs in the wine-purchasing decision of consumers. One expert analyzes 
the purchasing decision of consumers as if they ask the following three questions: a) what is the 
‘occasion’, and how much will I spend?; b) what is the origin of the wine, and what do I know 
about this country?; c) what grape variety, flavors, brand, decorations and other characteristics does 
the product have, and do they fit with the occasion? Influencing the second part of this chain of 
decision-making is a collective challenge for the Chilean wine industry. It may even require 
earmarking Chilean wines with a national symbol (that can compete with the Australian kangaroo 
and ‘Art of Africa’), according to a second expert. The current image of the Chilean wine industry 
entails a risk of being locked in the lower segments of the markets, which not necessarily is a 
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problem if it were not so that “Chile appears to be more vulnerable than others, [as] it loses market 
share even when it drops prices, or increases bulk exports. Low prices—or a low-cost strategy 
alone, appear not to be enough to maintain competitiveness in the wine industry”. So, the super and 
ultra premium market segments need to be penetrated, and some Chilean wineries are certainly 
capable of doing that (Chile won 8% of awards and 7% of all medals at the London International 
Wine Challenge Rewards 2003; Heijbroek and Rubio 2003). The question is how to combine a low-
cost strategy of some wineries and high-end market focused strategies of other wineries, 
considering the image effects of the former for the latter?  
A complication for Chilean winemakers is that their product is the first consumer product that 
Chile sells in world markets. Chile is largely unknown to consumers in many markets. Hence, 
building up a ‘brand of Chile’ not only tackles some problems of the Chilean wine industry, but 
may also help other parts of the Chilean economy exporting consumer products (e.g. salmon, fruit). 
Considering the thus potentially path-breaking effect of promoting Chilean wine for the rest of the 
nation’s export sector, investment in the area of marketing and promotion may attract public 
support, along with associations from other industries. 
There are links between collective marketing and innovation efforts. For example, Chile has a 
clear opportunity to develop and brand the unique Carmenère grape variety, according to several 
experts. Others state that the Chilean wine brand may include environmentally clean processes and 
health-promoting impact of, say, the Cabernet Sauvignon produced in the Colchagua valley. Such 
elements of branding would not only imply coordinated efforts to streamline practices along and 
across value chains, but certainly would also require training of lower and medium-level field staff, 
next to investments in information and communication technologies (ICT) so as to create a 
transparent supply-chain for downstream actors: wine importers and final consumers. 
Innovation is second in importance for the competitiveness of the Chilean wine industry. An 
often-heard point made by experts is the need to differentiate products, away from or at least 
complementing oak-based processing. Differentiation means increasing variety. To this, one may 
add a series of other problems and needs. One is to improve the quality and consistency of wines, 
e.g. of the ‘new’ Carmenere or the newly established Denomination of Origin (DO’s) in Chile. This 
requires a more effective diffusion of available know-how along with gradual improvements based 
on a better control of daily operations, finding solutions for short-term problems, optimizing 
vinification processes, promoting environmentally clean production, ensuring a visibly healthy 
product, etc. Information technology is useful to step up monitoring and control both in the field 
and in the bodegas, while sophisticated logistic (JIT, SCM) and organizational approaches (e.g. ISO 
9001 procedures) also need to be addressed. These are opportunities for the Chilean wine industry, 
to be seized through a collective approach. Finally, for differentiation, it will be necessary to 
develop new technology in Chile, so as to reduce dependence on technology imported from and 
made by competitors (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and more recently Australia). 
This challenge clearly represents a collective task, as product innovations are uncertain, require 
indivisibly large investments, produce positive knowledge spillovers, etcetera. 
In the area of internationalization, the Chilean wine industry made a lot of progress. Yet, one 
expert told us to be looking forward ‘with a lot of concern’. This may relate with the twofold 
challenge to move from traditional export markets in Europe and the United States to emerging 
markets such as East-Asia and Russia, and to move up into super premium and ultra premium 
market segments. In fact, this was the definition of internationalization that we used in the 
interview: geographical diversification of markets and deeper penetration of those markets. 
Continuing Chile’s export success would require a thorough ‘study of markets’, or, as another 
expert put it: ‘tracing, tracking and analyzing all information about products, channels, buyers, and 
consumers; we have to build up relevant marketing know-how, and invest in language and social 
skills’. Moving into new markets, such as Russia or China, brings along similar needs, e.g. to gain 
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insight in consumer behavior, channels and importers in specific countries, to offer variety and 
consistency, etcetera. The collective dimension of these efforts resides in that effects of scale, scope 
and reputation are critical. Hence, no Chilean winery can go for it alone. Large firms will need 
other, smaller firms to offer variety, and every firm entering a new market requires other firms to 
behave responsibly, with a view to country-level reputation effects. Hence, co-ordination in the area 
of further internationalization is required against a background of excess supply and falling prices, 
making firms eager to sell, no matter where and how. So, the concern of the above-quoted expert 
appears to be in place. 
In the area of education and training, three levels of human resources are relevant: field 
workers, oenologists/production managers, and strategic management (owners, sales, export 
managers). Starting with the last, it is important to start up a discussion within the industry 
concerning the tasks that individual firms can or should perform, and what problems are to be 
solved on a joint basis. An economic analysis of the optimal mix of competition and co-operation 
between firms and other actors in the cluster is required as a basis for formulating convincing 
‘community arguments’. Next, managers on both old and new firms may need (additional) training 
in international marketing. At the level of oenologists, the starting point is that Chilean oenologists 
are trained in agricultural sciences. Hence, they have the advantage of possessing general 
agricultural knowledge. Also, oenologists are involved in an international labor market; after 
finishing their studies, they may go to France, Australia, or elsewhere, to gain experience and bring 
it back to Chile. According to some experts, however, Chilean oenologists still miss relevant 
industrial and chemical knowledge. At the level of field workers, the situation is most chaotic. At 
this level, specific training is currently practically non-existent. During the harvest, inexperienced 
people are hired through intermediaries with access to remote labor markets. Meanwhile, as one 
expert observed, ‘80 % of the quality of wine is being determined at this level’. Given the scale of 
the problem and the positive externalities involved, improving the above situation is clearly a 
collective task. 
Infrastructure (which we defined in our interview as ‘external to the firm, facilitating physical 
transport and virtual information and communication flows’), is not considered to be important, nor 
are collective actions in this area. However, experts may underestimate this problem. The 
Corporación Chilena del Vino (CCV) is the only organization linking marketing and innovation 
challenges with infrastructure requirements. It appears to be the only organization with an explicit 
supply-chain perspective (competition occurs between supply chains, not firms). Optimizing 
vinification processes, promoting clean production, ensuring a visibly healthy product to final 
consumers, ensuring quality in line with ISO 9001 norms requires infrastructure enabling proper 
flows of information (with a view to the development of SCM) and physical goods (for JIT). 
A final observation concerning table 11 is that collective action problems—relevant 
especially in marketing & promotion and internationalization, predominantly reside in the problem 
of free riding. According to experts, many wineries would prefer a ‘wait, see and copy attitude’ 
above undertaking efforts to turn joint actions into a success. Hence, a weak point of the industry 
would be the ‘hesitation to co-operate’. Other problems that experts mention refer to a lack of 
strategic capabilities at the level of top management, and problems with trust, the role of leader 
firms, associations and state involvement. Below, we present data concerning these aspects of the 
quality of cluster governance. 
 
 
B. Quality of cluster governance 
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Above we saw that problems in several areas keep the Chilean wine industry from using its 
full potential in export markets. Next, we saw that CAPs are relevant, in varying degrees. In this 
section, the question is whether, to what extent and how these CAPs are being solved. 
A first comment is that the Chilean wine cluster seems to be rather complete, despite a few structural 
weaknesses (see annex 1). Exporting wineries often have their own vineyards, so that they can control the 
quality of grapes. If they need additional grapes, they can rely on a large number of primary producers, 
either on the (spot) market or through long-term contracting. The last mechanism becomes more important, 
in line with the quality requirements of most exporting wineries. Next, most suppliers of primary producers 
are locally available. This is not always so in the case of the secondary wine production, however. Caps 
and corks are imported from Portugal; stainless steel processing equipment is bought from Italy, Australia, 
Germany; oak barrels are sourced in the United States and France; and state-of-the art warehousing 
materials originate from companies like DuPont. So, the Chilean wine industry may be 
technologically up-to-date, partly as a result of the influence of foreign investors over the past two 
decades, but its dependence on foreign technology of its (main) competitors increased likewise. 
Better news is that the cluster can count with a number of support institutes however, both public 
and private. Their quality will be discussed below. Leader firms are also present, including large 
and traditional wine makers such as Concha y Toro, relatively new and local firms such as Montes 
SA, joint ventures or firms that are fully foreignly owned such as Casa Lapostolle. Their role will 
also be discussed below. Table 12 presents the evidence collected in line with our theoretical 
framework (figure 1), where trust, intermediaries, leader firms, and the quality of solutions to CAPs 
are the principal variables determining the quality of cluster governance. 
 
Table 12 
MAIN FACTORS DETERMINING THE QUALITY OF WINE CLUSTER GOVERNANCE 
(percentage experts) 
Proposition Agrees Disagrees No opinion 
The presence of trust facilitates the co-ordination  of collective action in the 
Chilean wine industry   64 
a 36 0 
The presence of (knowledge) intermediaries improves the co-ordination of 
collective actions 82 14 4 
The presence of leader firms in the Chilean wine industry improves the co-
ordination of collective actions 64 29 7 
Effective collective actions in the industry triggered other collective actions 72 21 7 
Improving the quality of coordination of collective actions will significantly 
enhance the (export) performance of the Chilean wine industry 96 4 0 
Source: survey September-October 2003 
a the number of experts agreeing that generalized trust facilitates co-ordination is significantly lower (paired t-test). 
Table 12 shows that almost all experts believe that the quality of governance is currently a 
bottleneck preventing the Chilean wine industry to reap its full potential. This is in line with 
conclusions of other observers of the industry (see e.g. Heijbroek and Rubio 2003: 39). Next, the 
table shows that trust and leader firms cause more disagreement among experts than the other two 
variables: intermediaries and the quality of past solutions to CAPs. Below, we deal with the 
qualitative comments of experts explaining their answers. 
C. Trust 
We asked respondents if the presence of trust facilitates the co-ordination of collective 
actions in the Chilean wine industry. We explained that trust refers to a general assumption about 
the ‘benevolence’ of actors ‘across the board’, i.e., not pertaining to a particular group that one may 
be familiar with. Our aim was to measure trust based on general values, norms and beliefs about 
legitimacy, identification with other people across the board, and empathy (the extent to which 
people are willing and capable of understanding each other). 
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With regard to this kind of general trust, Chile is not in a good position, according to one 
third of the respondents, and a significantly lower number of experts agreeing with the respective 
statement (table 12). Explaining his viewpoint, one expert refers to the difficult relation between 
two winery associations throughout the 1990s (see below, intermediaries), and to the finding that 
speakers at a seminar that will be held soon ‘preferably be foreigners, as local participants are not 
willing to listen to each other’. Other experts stress the (‘extremely’) individualist attitudes of 
Chilean winemakers, who disregard the supply chain(s) of which they are part, along with collective 
problems of the industry. In line with individualist attitudes, Chilean wine entrepreneurs would be 
‘short-term minded’, and biased towards ‘understanding better the utility of inter-firm competition 
than that of inter-firm co-operation’. Asked why these attitudes prevail, some experts mention 
political and economic conditions during 1973-90, while others go further back in history and 
mention ‘failures with cooperativism’ (elsewhere) in Latin America. 
Interestingly, some experts note that some people in the industry get along very well with 
each other. As one of them put it: ‘in Chile, we know each other. It is like an extended family with 
different levels of intensity of linkages. If you are an outsider, you don’t get credit. Trust is reserved 
for insiders’. Another expert maintains that contacts between wineries are very ‘informal’, based on 
‘long-standing personal relations between owners of firms’ and ‘a sense of similarity’—both 
socially and professionally, and even ‘pleasant’, e.g. in the context of increasing collaboration 
between two winery associations at the end of the 1990s (see below). These opinions indicate that 
trust in the Chilean wine industry may be of a more particularistic kind, constrained to certain 
(groups of) people. Joint travels to participate in trade fairs around the world activated this type of 
trust involving some winery owners. 
The arrival of new firms and managers in the Chilean wine industry over the past decades 
revealed the particularistic nature of trust, but may simultaneously, through time, change this 
situation. On the one hand, we noticed a perception among experts that some entrants are 
‘opportunistic prestige seekers not taking seriously the art and business of winemaking’. So, new 
entries appear to have caused tensions between old, established businesses and younger, smaller 
firms. On the other hand, current market developments in the wake of the Chilean wine industry’s 
internationalization make that the two groups start to co-operate (see below, intermediaries), as a 
result of the emerging insight that maintaining the export success of the Chilean wine industry 
requires collective marketing and promotion efforts, to start with. 
Some experts mention distrust between the private and public sector, which also affects the 
wine industry. In Chile, it is common to consider successful enterprises with suspicion; their 
success is thought to be due to ‘tricks’, not entrepreneurial talent. Politicians—concerned about the 
number of votes during the next elections, therefore keep distance from private interests, officially 
at least. Unofficially, there may be some state support, but in ‘hidden, less transparent ways’, as one 
expert put it. This may in turn produce two outcomes: a scandal confirming general suspicion, or 
frustration among private firms perceiving a lack of strategic capability in the Chilean public sector, 
whereas in other countries, e.g. Australia, the state is active in developing the wine industry, while 
in China the state is even omnipresent in steering the nation’s development process. 
On the whole, the trust issue causes some disagreement among experts. On the one hand, 
generalized trust does not appear to reduce transaction costs or enhance the scope of collective 
action. Hence, current problems, e.g. of surplus capacity in the industry, are not being solved. On 
the other hand, there are signs that current market trends provoke a ‘conversation’ (dialogue) among 
actors in the Chilean wine industry, who were not on speaking terms before. This may imply that 
the expert who told us that ‘imitation, not dialogue’ is common in the Chilean wine industry, has to 
adjust this point of view soon, and that other experts focusing on the extent to which a few 
problems are under collective scrutiny (see below) are right to arrive at a more rosy conclusion 
regarding trust. 
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D. Leader firms 
We asked respondents if the presence of ‘leader firms’ in the Chilean wine industry 
contributes in positive ways to the co-ordination of collective actions in the cluster. In the Spanish 
translation of the definition of ‘leader firms’ in our questionnaire, we stressed that such firms can be 
either relatively young and small firms or large and old conglomerates, as long as they push towards 
certain changes in the industry and invest in that direction. We thus avoided that respondents would 
merely think of large wine exporters. 
Table 12 shows that the experts interviewed lack consensus regarding the role of leader firms. 
Some are positive, others also point out negative aspects concerning the role of these firms. Some 
experts repeat the problems discussed above in the case of trust. It would thus be difficult for leader 
firms to promote and invest in collective actions because they are part of a (Latin American) history 
characterized by failures with co-operative action. Leader firms would also suffer from individualist 
attitudes and practices. They would be reluctant to ‘share information and work together with small 
wineries’. 
On the other hand, it is recognized that international market developments provoke a change 
for the better. Some leader firms e.g. have sufficient resources to enter new export markets (e.g. 
Concha y Toro conquering China), but found out that they need to offer a variety of products they 
cannot produce themselves. Here, small firms may help, while leader firms may accommodate the 
financial and human resource constraints of smaller firms when entering new markets. With this, a 
need arises to coordinate production and marketing strategies of a larger number of firms in the 
wine industry. So, the internationalization process induces leader firms to reconsider their 
individualist attitudes and practices, as can be witnessed in the case of the emerging co-operation 
between Viñas de Chile and Chilevid.  
One expert noted that leader firms have not shown any leadership in the development of a 
shared vision for the Chilean wine industry. They do not part from a supply chain or a cluster 
perspective. In the area of public-private interactions, they may still lobby their private interests, not 
of the industry as a whole. So, we may conclude that their leadership is incipient, and that the direct 
and network effects of their investments are so far greater than the broader category of indirect 
cluster effects. This may change, once joint efforts in the sphere of marketing, promotion and 
technological development prove to be effective, and the gaps between large and small wineries, 
and between wineries and wine grape producers, are closed. So far, the glass is both half full and 
half empty. 
E.  Intermediaries 
We next asked respondents if the presence of knowledge intermediaries (research institutes, 
consultancy firms, information brokers, and business associations fulfilling these and other roles) 
improves the co-ordination of collective actions in the cluster. Compared with trust, this variable 
provoked more unanimity among the respondents, who seem to evaluate the role of intermediaries 
in relatively favorable terms. Below, we describe the main intermediaries of relevance for the 
Chilean wine industry, with a focus on business associations and technological institutes. 
The oldest association of wineries is Viñas de Chile. Founded in 1949, it currently groups 48 
wineries, including large wine exporters such as Concha y Toro, San Pedro, Santa Carolina, Santa 
Rita, Undurraga and Valdivieso, but also smaller firms exporting high-quality wines like Montes 
and Casa Lapostolle. Viñas de Chile traditionally focused on government policies and regulatory 
frameworks influencing domestic market development. Today, lobby activities also point at policies 
and regulations relevant for export market access. Hence, Viñas de Chile participates in negotiations 
about free trade treaties, most recently with the EU. Other current activities are the training of field 
workers in vineyards with the financial incentive of the state program SENCE (Servicio Nacional 
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de Capacitación y Empleo), to step up co-operation with the Catholic University so as to stimulate 
endogenous research and technology development, and to work with another wine business 
association (Chilevid) in the area of international promotion of Chilean wines.  
A second association of wineries is Chilevid (‘asociación de productores de vinos finos para 
la exportación’). Founded in 1993, this association groups 42, relatively young and small 
wineries—many of which emerged during the boom years of the 1990s. Chilevid focuses on the 
acquisition of projects and external financial resources to develop the business of their members, the 
provision of information and advice on legislative, technical, and commercial aspects of wine 
exports, the organisition of trade fairs abroad, and the development of relations with wine 
journalists. At the beginning of the 1990s, Chilevid’s membership was eager to export but missed 
the know-how to do so. Hence, it challenged and sought co-operation with the older winery 
association Viñas de Chile, where some members were more experienced selling to distant export 
markets.  
In the 1990s, Chilevid departed from a threefold mission to overcome a) the individualist 
attitude of Chilean wineries, b) its domestic market focus, and c) its bias towards inter-firm 
competition at the expense of mutually beneficial co-operation to conquer world markets where, 
firstly, origins of wine (countries) compete with each other, following which individual firms 
compete after consumers made their choice for a certain origin. Viñas de Chile was initially 
reluctant to co-operate with Chilevid, whose membership consisted of new entrants in the Chilean 
wine industry and thus was perceived as new competition. The (cognitive) development taking 
place in the wake of the interaction between two associations is the still emerging and contested 
insight that winning market share in world markets is firstly a matter of intra-cluster (and maybe 
even across the board) co-operation between Chilean wineries (and fruit exporters, mining 
businesses, salmon producers). International wine market developments have been supportive of the 
above developments, with the popular premium and premium segments of the market suffering 
price competition, and higher segments requiring a series of measures that we discussed above: 
promoting brands, differentiation and consistency. 
 Co-operation between Viñas de Chile and Chilevid is key for the further development of the 
Chilean wine industry. It breaks with the fundamental problems of individualism and the one-sided 
reliance on competition, which make room for a more subtle balance between inter-firm 
competition and co-operation. This is a very important development in the Latin American context 
(Buitelaar 2003). It is equally difficult, considering the results of a first attempt to step up co-
operation in the area of the promotion of Chilean wines through a new organization: ‘Wines of 
Chile’, founded in 1996. This attempt failed, presumably because of lack of balance in terms of 
ownership and decision-making power between the two associations. However, a second attempt to 
revive Wines of Chile is underway as from the year 2000. In March 2003, an office of this 
organization (official name: Promotora Wines of Chile) was opened in London. The Promotora 
Wines of Chile has four functions: to organize lunches (with wine experts and journalists), to 
participate in fairs, to collect consumer information in the various and different countries, and to 
establish a ‘brand of Chile’. Expectations are high at both sides of the partnership, including the 
experts we consulted in September and October 2003. Skeptics may argue that the re-emergence of 
Wines of Chile in 2000 was a simple response to the requirements of the Chilean government to co-
fund joint marketing and promotion activities of the wine industry. Such will have played a role, 
certainly, but we hypothesize that the fast internationalization of the Chilean wine industry 
provoked a strategic discussion among the two most important associations about a key issue of 
how much and where to co-operate so as to compete more effectively in world markets. Newcomers 
played a key role in this regard; ‘they were more aggressive’, said one expert. 
Another key development is the enhancement of vertical supply-chain awareness in the 
Chilean wine industry. In this regard, the role of CCV (Corporación Chilena del Vino) merits 
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attention. Founded in 1997, its membership includes both primary (grape) and secondary producers 
(wineries), as well as suppliers at both sides of the value chains of primary and secondary 
producers. Activities of CCV include the diffusion of technical and market information through 
special publications, the organization of training courses, and representing members in negotiations 
about new policies, treaties and regulations. Next, CCV acts as an intermediary for CORFO—the 
main channel of the Chilean government to provide public support (in the form of revolving funds) 
to the private business sector. CORFO has various programs in place, in the areas of technical 
assistance, SME development, supplier upgrading (oriented towards suppliers of large firms), 
production management and business administration. CCV says to identify projects on a demand 
basis, comparing buyer requirements and supply capabilities before proposing projects to CORFO. 
CCV’s work thus results in the solution of pressing technological problems, while stimulating the 
diffusion of available know-how. CCV’s work to develop supply chain awareness about 
environmental, health and quality issues is a more long-term nature. 
Next, we mention Viñas de Chile’s recent initiative to create a center for fundamental 
research and technology development in co-operation with a specialized research center at the 
Catholic University (CEVIUC). All members of Viñas de Chile make a fixed and variable financial 
contribution to the budget of this new initiative to develop unique technology in Chile. A board of 
advisors consisting of representatives of Viñas de Chile and CEVIUC evaluates research project 
proposals to be executed. It is too early to consider results, as this initiative focuses on long-term 
technological development. What is interesting is that this long-term focus is emerging, which tends 
to counteract another traditional weakness in the Chilean wine industry: its orientation towards 
short-term gains. 
Another point is that different technological institutes (of the Catholic University, the 
University of Chile, and the University of Talca) started to coordinate their research projects, 
exchange knowledge and work together, with a threefold objective: a) to avoid duplication in 
research work; b) to improve external relations and communication and c) to strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis clients. The above institutes received positive evaluations, albeit regarding 
technological aspects of the winemaking process. 
A final intermediary is Nuevos Mundos SA: an information broker, specialized in the wine 
industry. It collects information on the wine cluster as a whole, including (state) support 
institutions. The emphasis is on structural and performance data of private wineries: sales, markets 
and prices. Foreign buyers make use of these data, so as to make decisions on whom to contact for 
possible trades. So, we could suppose that Nuevos Mundos provides foreign buyers with access to 
the Chilean wine industry, by enhancing its transparency. On the other hand, the question can be 
raised what role Nuevos Mundos really plays. It has to strike a balance between effectively 
providing foreign buyers with the information they require, but not too much, as this would close 
the doors of domestic wineries. This is still part of a market efficiency-increasing role of Nuevos 
Mundos. The question whether it is an instrument of control of foreign traders is unanswered. 
F.  Example effects of effective collective action in the past 
Table 12 shows that 72% of the experts consider that there have been examples of collective 
action in the Chilean wine industry that triggered other collective actions. Almost all agreeing with 
the proposition explained, however, that so far collective actions are incipient in the Chilean wine 
industry, and relatively unimportant to explain its thus far good export performance. Yet, there are 
signs of increasing co-operation and better co-ordination of collective efforts, which is the reason of 
the high score in the table for this variable, despite the incipient nature of collective actions itself. 
At present and in the near future, the co-operation between Viñas de Chile and Chilevid is decisive. 
Expectations of the Promotora Wines of Chile are high. Its results will be closely watched, and may 
determine the perception of the feasibility and effectiveness of future co-operation elsewhere in the 
industry. 
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G. Quality of solutions to CAPs 
Collective action problems (CAPs) can be reduced and managed on the basis of positive 
contributions by leader firms, associations, knowledge intermediaries, public organizations, 
effective community arguments and voice (see section 2). Here, we discuss the views of 
respondents regarding these contributions (see table 13 for an overall assessment), in the context of 
five regimes for solving CAPs: the innovation, marketing & promotion, internationalization, 
training & education, and infrastructure regimes (see table 14).  
Table 13 shows that the contributions of business associations and leader firms are 
considered to be relatively positive by the experts. There is little differentiation between the six 
variables, however. None gets a score lower than 3, implying that this variable would ‘not at all’ or 
contribute just ‘a bit’ to the effectiveness of solutions to CAPs in the Chilean wine industry. 
Overall, experts seem to be quite positive on the quality of solutions to CAPs. 
Table 13 
OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES CONTRIBUTING TO SOLUTIONS TO CAPS IN THE CHILEAN WINE 
INDUSTRY 
Variable Mean a SD 
The presence and rol of leader firms 3.82 1.12 
The presence and role of associations 3.93a 1.05 
The presence and role of knowledge intermediaries 3.25 1.11 
The presence and role of public organizations 3.39 0.96 
The current content and legitimacy of community arguments 3.22 1.05 
The current use of voice by individual firms 3.32 1.09 
Source: survey September-October 2003 
a score of 1 means that a variable contributes nothing; 2 =  contributes a ‘little’; 3 = contributes; 4 = contributes a 
lot; 5 = contributes very much.  * : leader firms contribute significantly more than other variables, except 
associations (paired t-test, P < 0.10) while the same holds for associations (P value < 0.05) 
 
Table 14 shows that business associations are especially seen to contribute positively to the 
marketing & promotion and the internationalization regimes. The table also shows that leader firms 
are also important, contributing to the improvement of the marketing & promotion, 
internationalization and innovation regimes. They are said to have a strong example effect within 
the industry. For example, a leader firm may conquer a new export market (e.g. Concha y Toro 
starting to sell in China), signaling to other firms that this is indeed possible. Also in terms of 
product innovation, they may show the way to other producers. These are spillover effects, 
however, not network or cluster effects proper. Next, example effects can be due to individual skills 
and excellence of firms, not so much visionary leadership regarding cluster development or 
strategic investment in that direction. In fact, the role of leader firms in the Chilean wine industry is 
subject to debate, as we saw above. Hence, we see relatively high standard deviations in the case of 






QUALITY OF FIVE REGIMES TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO CAPS IN THE CHILEAN WINE INDUSTRY 
Variables influencing the quality of the innovation regime Mean SD 
Leader firms 2.85 2.61 
Associations 1.54 2.50 
Knowledge intermediaries 2.58 1.68 
Public organizations 0.77 2.34 
Community arguments 1.04 2.41 
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Voice 1.54 2.73 
Overall 1.72 2.38 
Variables influencing the quality of the marketing & promotion region Mean SD 
Leader firms 2.88 2.63 
Associations 3.40 1.35 
Knowledge intermediaries 1.60 2.45 
Public organizations 2.00 1.74 
Community argument 2.24 2.39 
Voice 2.12 2.03 
Overall 2.37 2.10 
Variables influencing the quality of the internationalization regime Mean SD 
Leader firms 2.89 2.28 
Associations 3.12 1.56 
Knowledge intermediaries 1.31 2.24 
Public organizations 2.19 1.66 
Community argument 1.77 2.25 
Voice 1.85 2.20 
Overall 2.19 2.03 
Variables influencing the quality of the training and education regime Mean SD 
Leader firms 1.92 2.55 
Associations 2.44 1.56 
Knowledge intermediaries 3.12 1.82 
Public organizations 1.76 2.52 
Community argument 2.12 2.07 
Voice 1.00 1.73 
Overall 2.06 2.04 
Variables influencing the quality of the infrastructure regime Mean SD 
Leader firms 1.15 2.34 
Associations 1.15 1.54 
Knowledge intermediaries 0.77 1.70 
Public organizations 0.73 2.39 
Community argument 0.42 2.53 
Voice 0.15 1.78 
Overall 0.73 2.05 
Source: survey September-October 2003 
a score of –5 in the table implies a very negative influence of a variable on the solution to CAPs/quality of the 
regime; +5 means that its influence is very positive. Note 2: we still have to do the usual statistical tests. 
The Chilean State, on the other hand, receives a mixed evaluation. Its role is considered 
positive regarding internationalization and marketing & promotion. This is largely due to the role of 
ProChile in helping wineries on their way in export markets. ProChile has offices around the world 
in the Chilean Embassies, and provides wineries with information on (the quality and track record 
of) importers, retailers, etc. There appears to be consensus among experts that this is a valuable 
contribution. Next, the Chilean state provides funding for the Promotora Wines of Chile, which may 
be another reason for the positive evaluation of the role of public organizations in the area of 
marketing & promotion and internationalization. 
In the context of the wine business, ‘the Chilean State’ mainly refers to the following 
organizations that play an active role (we thus disregard INIA, considered as ineffective by the 
experts interviewed, and other public institutes that occasionally interfere with the industry). Firstly, 
SAG (Servicio Agricola y Ganadero) handles legislative issues for wineries (licensing, ownership 
rights, etc.). Secondly, ProChile promotes exports of Chilean products around the world. Thirdly, 
CORFO is an organization founded in the first half of the 20th century so as to promote investments 
in state enterprises, but which currently dedicates itself to support the private sector by means of 
revolving funds that may cover part of the costs of technical assistence, R&D, collaborative 
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projects, etc. In the wine industry, CORFO supports the so-called ‘Rutas del Vino’—regional 
associations of wineries promoting tourism in their neighbourhood by enabling visits of tourists to 
their vineyards, and a number of technology projects through CCV. It appears, however, that this 
last contribution is not effective, considering the relatively low average score that experts give 
public organizations regarding the innovation regime. One expert told us that CORFO even has a 
‘separating effect’ in the cluster, due to the static nature of its support mechanisms and the 
administrative-burocratic ways of allocating funds in the industry. 
Another point is that the Chilean state is not considered to play an active, strategic role in the 
development of the wine industry, nor in other industries and sectors. Besides a possible lack of 
capability to play an activist role (which is a very good reason not to intervene, to avoid that 
‘government failure’ replaces ‘market failures’, see World Bank 1997), Chilean governments also 
seem to unwilling and reluctant to get involved with the private sector. Its reliance on liberal 
policies and its ‘free market’ orientation apparently serves to calm down public suspicion about 
‘clientelismo’—a problem discussed above in the section on trust. Here, the upshot is that public 
hesitation to get involved with the private sector ignores coordination requirements arising in a 
setting of inter-firm networks and clusters. A cluster perspective of the economy and economic 
development goes beyond markets and beyond traditional ‘market failure’ arguments. From a 
cluster perspective, ‘system failures’ may be relevant, next to with ‘market failures’. Both may be a 
basis for public action. The problem is that the idea of ‘system failures’, and what the government 
may do about it, appears to be largely new in (the public opinion: media and voters) in Chile. A 
simple example of a system failure is the problem that private firms have trouble levying 
contributions and enforcing payments of other firms, e.g. when establishing a fund for joint R&D to 
develop new technology. This is highly relevant in the case of the Chilean wine industry, which 
needs to differentiate products and develop own technology, but current law does not provide the 
private sector with an enforcement mechanism to fulfil this strategic need. 
The marketing & promotion, internationalization, and training & education regimes in the 
Chilean wine industry are considered to be relatively well-developed, whereas the innovation and 
infrastructure regimes appear to be the weak spots in the cluster governance. The low score of the 
innovation regime is especially interesting, as the experts interviewed are aware of the importance 
of innovation, while this seems hardly the case for infrastructure. Hence, the weakness of the latter 
regime may be due to a lack of attention for the theme, whereas in the case of innovation, experts 
are aware of its importance but yet consider that means are insufficient to promote collective action 
in this area. In our view, the main problem is a lack of understanding to what extent, and how, joint 
action may stimulate innovation. 
Compared with other clusters, it seems that experts are relatively positive regarding the 
quality of the five regimes to solve CAPs in the Chilean wine cluster. Scores regarding the 
effectiveness of the above regimes in port clusters where we applied the questionnaire before (see 
De Langen and Visser 2003 and De Langen 2004) are somewhat lower than in the current case 
study. 
 
H. Comparing Chile and Australia 
A final way to assess the quality of governance in the Chilean wine cluster is to compare it 
with one of its most important competitors—Australia. Between 1990 and 2000, Australia also 
performed very well, along with Chile and other New World wine producers. Australia by 1997 was 
the world’s 4th largest exporter in value terms (Anderson and Berger 1999); it is still the largest 
among New World wine exporters, although the others (Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and South 
Africa) are catching up. In certain markets, however, both Australia and Chile were well positioned 
to increase exports and their market share, e.g. in the UK. However, while Australia managed to 
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boost its market share from 1.6 to 19.5 % during 1990-2000, Chile’s rose from 1 to 6 %.2 Where 
does this difference come from? May this be due, at least to some extent, to a difference in the 
quality of coordination of collective actions in both countries? 
Table 15 displays information regarding the perceptions of key experts in the Chilean wine 
industry regarding the quality of basic and advanced factors of relevance for the competitiveness of 
the wine industry in both Australia and Chile. 
Table 15 
EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY OF BASIC AND ADVANCED FACTORS IN THE AUSTRALIAN AND 
CHILEAN WINE INDUSTRY 
Chile Australia Advantage Cover A Basic and advance factors 
Mean SD  Mean SD       Mean          SD 
Quality of top-level management 2.46 1.45 3.89 0.96 -1.43a 0.49 
Technical know-how of wine-making & field personnel 2.44 1.83 3.67 0.73 -1.23a 1.10 
Quality of local suppliers 2.36 1.7 3.75 0.74 -1.39a 0.96 
Quality of land and other natural resources 4.68 0.61 3.00 1.63 1.68a -1.02 
Intensity of local competition 2.73 2.41 3.10 1.09 -0.37 1.32 
Role of the state 1.19 2.14 4.31 0.62 -3.12a,b  1.52 
Role of knowledge intermediaries 1.59 1.55 4.12 0.65 -2.53 a,b 0.90 
Role of market leaders 2.74 1.65 3.78 0.80 -1.04a 0.85 
Quality of solutions to collective action problems in the 
area of innovation 0.81 2.3 4.08 1.13 -3.27a,b 1.17 
Quality of solutions to collective action problems in the 
area of marketing and promotion 1.37 1.94 4.43 0.92 -3.06a,b 1.02 
Quality of solutions to collective action problems in the 
area of training: top-level managers 1.63 2.1 3.65 0.83 -2.02a 1.27 
Quality of solutions to collective action problems in the 
area of training: wine-making/field personnel 1.69 1.98 3.67 0.92 -1.98a 1.06 
Source: survey September-October 2003 
Note: the mean figures in the table are average scores of expert’s evaluation of the quality of the factors in the rows, on a 
scale between –5 (very poor) and +5 (very strong). We explained that 0 means ‘neither strong, nor weak’, etcetera. 
a: the difference between Chile and Australia is statistically significant (paired t-test, P < 0.05); 
b : the differences between Chile and Australia regarding these four factors are significantly more negative than for other 
factors (paired t-test, P = 0.05) 
 
There are three ways to read the table. Firstly, considering only the scores of Chile, it is 
striking that experts give relatively low scores for the quality of collective action regimes, along 
with the role of the Chilean state and knowledge intermediaries. So, according to our experts, Chile 
scores relatively high on basic factors, and relatively low on advanced factors. Secondly, comparing 
Chile with Australia (rowwise), it seems that Australia outperforms Chile in all factors but one: the 
quality of natural resources, where Chile is perceived to have an advantage over Australia. All this 
differences are significant, expect for the ‘local rivalry’ factor. Thirdly, the difference between 
Chile and Australia is more pronounced in the case of the quality of solutions to collective action 
problems in the areas of innovation and marketing & promotion, along with the role of the state and 
knowledge intermediaries. The difference between Chile and Australia regarding these advanced 
factors is significantly more negative for Chile than for the other factors. 
                                                     
2    Not everywhere, however, is the picture rosy for Australia; while it performed well in the UK, Ireland, Southeast Asia 
and New Zealand, it has had more difficulty in North America and East Asian countries incl. Japan. Also the 
development of unit sale prices has been slightly less favourable in the case of Australia (1987-1997), compared with 
some other wine producers, including Chile (Anderson and Berger 1999). 
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Explaining his answers, one expert pointed out that in Australia, a strategic decision was 
made at the industry level to focus on a minimum product quality, to safeguard the wine industry’s 
image as a whole, and to make collective investments in marketing (see also Anderson 2001). Next, 
efforts to promote endogenous technological development would have been more effective in 
Australia, due to the concentration of financial, marketing and R&D power in a limited number of 
large firms, next to superior self-organization and state-reinforced financing schemes for R&D, 
training and education. Thirdly, the Australian state adopted a more active and strategic role in 
establishing an adequate normative and regulatory framework, thus helping the private sector to 
solve market and system failures. So, in the words of Anderson (2001, 13): “the Australian wine 
industry during the past decade has enjoyed a high and envied degree of collaboration (..). 
Maintaining and expanding those activities requires a non-stop flow of deliberate and skilful 
leadership, something that the Australian wine industry has been fortunate to have in relative 
abundance compared with both other Australian industries and the wine industry abroad”.  
I. Importance of governance in the Chilean wine cluster: past 
and future 
Above we have seen that cluster governance seems to be a (relatively) weak spot in the 
functioning and performance of the Chilean wine industry. Such does not matter, as long as 
collective action and governance of collective action is not required. But in the Chilean wine 
industry, this is not the case, not any more, considering the above empirical evidence regarding 
present competitive problems, collective action requirements, CAPs and the quality of solutions to 
CAPs and cluster governance as a whole, and also according to the next table. 
Table 16 
RANKING OF FIVE FACTORS DETERMINING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CHILEAN WINE INDUSTRY, 
BEFORE AND AFTER 2000 (EXPERT OPINIONS) 
Before 2000 After 200  
Variables Mean SD Mean SD 
 
Change mean 
Structural features 2.11 1.1 2.79 1.23 -0.68 
Quality of coordination 4.11 0.96 2.39 1.10 1.72a 
National and international policies 2.96 0.88 3.61 0.99 -0.65 
Development of domestic markets 4.11 1.26 4.36 1.16 -0.25 
Developments in international markets 1.71 0.9 1.86 1.11 -0.15 
Source: survey September-October 2003. 
a mean score of 1 implies that the factor be ranked as the principal one by all industry experts. A mean of 5 implies 
consensus across experts that the factor is least important. Scores between 1 and 5 reflect various levels of 
consensus as to a factor’s importance; the closer to 1, the higher the consensus that the factor is most important, and 
the closer a score is to 5, the higher the consensus that the factor is least important. 
This change is larger and more positive than in the case of the other factors (paired t-test, P = 0.00) 
 
This table brings a couple of messages to the forefront: a) international market developments 
continues to be the most important factor in the eyes of the experts; b) collective action, 
coordination and cluster governance has so far been relatively unimportant to explain the good 
performance of the Chilean wine industry; but c) from now on, the quality of cluster governance 
will be crucial to safeguard and expand Chile’s position in world wine markets. In fact, the evidence 
in table 16 shows that the quality of coordination is the only factor that significantly moves up in 
the ranking, at the expense of other factors, whose relative (not absolute) importance therefore 
slightly decreases. With this, experts reveal their understanding of the importance of cluster 
governance in connection with the tasks specified before: building up a ‘brand of Chile’, moving up 
to super premium and ultra premium market segments, enhancing product differentiation and 
improving consistency of wines. Governance is also becoming more important because Chile’s 
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increasing importance as a wine exporter enhances its visibility and provokes (defensive) reactions 
of the larger trade blocks (EU, NAFTA), e.g. about quality (ISO 9001, D.O’s), environmental issues 
(the promotion of clean production systems), and health (supply-chain transparency). Finally, 
Chile’s main competitors (e.g. Australia and South Africa) compete on the basis of a cluster 
approach, superior coordination mechanisms and a more advanced role of the state, among other 
factors. 
Table 16 also shows that structural characteristics (the number and size of firms, ownership, 
vertical integration, foreign investment, availability and quality of production factors, etc.) will 
continue to be important for the Chilean wine industry. There is a need of consolidation (business 
scale enlargement through mergers and takeovers) in the industry so as to be able to make large 
investments in technological development, production and marketing. Next, foreign investors have 
in the past been quite important in terms of technology, prestige, marketing know-how, 
diversification of markets and learning-by-reciprocation (Nooteboom 2000), but they are likely to 
remain that important, e.g. when sustaining the move to super premium and ultra premium market 
segments. 
To sum up, external factors were in the past decisive to enable and explain Chile’s wine 
export success, but domestic factors at the cluster level are crucial during the present and upcoming 
period of time. 
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V.  Development prospects 
At the end of our interview, we asked experts to tell us which 
critical opportunities they perceive for the Chilean wine industry to 
improve its (export) performance and/or the coordination of collective 
actions in the cluster. Their answers are summarized as follows: 
a) A clear vision and long-term strategy for the development of the 
wine industry should be developed… 
b) …based on an economic analysis of what individual firms 
should do, and what tasks require joint action, collective 
investments and coordination at the network, supply-chain 
or cluster level. 
c) Large firms should become ‘real’ leaders, substituting a 
shared vision for the long-term development of the cluster 
for their individualistic, short-term and self-reliant attitudes. 
d) Industry consolidation facilitates the formulation and 
implementation of strategic projects, including indivisibly large 
investments in marketing, technology development and 
production, and may improve the coordination of collective 
actions (depending on the strategic and leadership 
capabilities of the larger firms). 
e) One business association could be responsible for implementing 
this strategy, i.e., Chilevid and Viñas de Chile can merge, under 
the condition that ‘new and/or diverging voices’ continue to 
be heard. 
f) The Promotora Wines of Chile has to succeed. Individual 
wineries should not expect gains in the short run, abandon 
individualist ‘tit for tat’ attitudes, and need to be prepared to  
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make investments with positive externalities for the networks of which they are part, for the 
wine cluster or for the Chilean export sector as a whole, also when these effects are uncertain 
and/or delayed. 
g) We need to develop the ‘brand of Chile’, on the basis of an accurate analysis of strengths and 
weaknesses of the Chilean wine industry. This complements branding at the level of regions 
(valleys with a DO) and individual wineries. A national symbol could fit this purpose of joint 
marketing. 
h) We have to move downstream, into distribution channels close to consumer markets, and make 
real work of marketing, knowing consumers, tracking and tracing their preferences and 
responses to new products. 
i) Continued internationalization is key; we need to diversify into new, emerging and non-
traditional markets that are growing. 
j) We should discuss how to sell our excess production during the following years, ensuring that 
bulk sales do not affect the (efforts to build up a) brand of Chile as a fine-wine producer, and 
hence the sale of fine wines. 
k) We should expand the coordination of, and perhaps even integrate the efforts of various 
academic R&D institutes. 
l) We have to accumulate a fund for basic and applied research, so as to solve short-term 
technological problems (clusterwide diffusion of know-how, vertical coordination of supply 
chains) as well as to stimulate long-term technological development in Chile. 
m) We have to promote social, environmental and health responsibility of the wine industry. This 
requires supply-chain management, i.e., effective coordination of information and product 
flows among all actors in the chain, and thus investing in (ICT and physical) infrastructure. 
n) We have to invest in massive training at lower levels of field staff to enhance the quality of 
grape growing, as well as in focused training of medium-level managers (industrial and 
chemical skills) and top-level management (strategy development, economic analysis of when, 
with whom and in which business areas to co-operate). 
o) We should involve the Chilean government in the development of the industry, making sure 
that public-private co-operation takes place in an atmosphere of trust between public and 
private parties, not the current distrust. 
This agenda poses a challenge for public policy. What role could the Chilean government 
play in the long-term development of the industry, why, and how? The remainder of this section is 
devoted to these three questions. 
In my view, the Chilean government, through its various institutions and ministries, could 
consider the following issues. First of all, it could sponsor a participatory analysis of the pros and 
cons of inter-firm competition vs. co-operation (the 2nd issue mentioned above), taking into account 
various inter-firm linkages (see figure 1 in section 2), and with input from a priori economic 
analysis of what clusters are about, how they complement markets in promoting dynamic economic 
development and (structural) change, what market and system failures can be relevant, and how 
these can be managed or solved. Such a participatory project would not only help to develop  the 
strategic capabilities of top management in the Chilean wine industry, but would also spill over to 
other industries and clusters, as a result of an example effect and/or the mobility of top managers in 
their segment of the labour market. Moreover, it would constitute a change in the relation between 
private and public sector agents (the 15th issue mentioned above), because public agents 
commissioning the analysis would only do so on the basis of their own learning about how clusters 
complement markets in promoting development, and how public agencies may handle cluster 
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(system) along with market failures. In turn, such public learning is more likely if high-ranking 
government officials would invest in this direction, retraining public staff at lower levels, with the 
strategic aim to embed state support programs and policies in ongoing development processes 
occurring in clusters. The outcome could be more flexible, responsive, embedded and yet generic 
development policies. 
A second area where public policy can play a role is strategy development, integration of 
joint action in the private sector, and industry consolidation (the 1st up to the 6th issue mentioned 
above). Stimulating efforts in specific industries and clusters to formulate a strategy to enhance their 
competitiveness is evidently of public interest, considering the implications of these strategies for 
the collective image of a nation in world markets, and their socio-economic impact, e.g. on labour 
market conditions, regional development, environmental and/or health issues. In line with this, 
public agents could require more coordination between different private organizations, e.g. in the 
sphere of R&D or industry representation, e.g. as a prerequisite for certain types of public support 
(as already seems to be happening in the case of the Promotora Wines of Chile). They could also 
use their relationships with top-level managers of large firms, changing the tone of the dialogue 
away from short-term issues of direct importance to individual firms (taxes, tariffs, etc), towards 
issues of long-term relevance to an industry, cluster or the export sector as a whole. Finally, such 
public involvement would imply that the state adopts a more subtle mix between anti-trust policy 
(with a view to static efficiency concerns) and the promotion of intra-industry collaboration (with a 
view to dynamic capabilities; see Nooteboom 1999). 
A third area of public interest concerns private investments generating positive externalities, for a 
network of firms, a cluster, an industry or export sector as a whole. Associations or leader firms making 
these investments do so to enjoy the benefits, hence their contribution. Insofar as the benefits are external to 
the firms making the investments, and spill over to other firms, other networks, other clusters or industries, 
and even a sector as a whole, public co-funding is effective from a social point of view. The Chilean wine 
industry is a pioneer for the Chilean export sector, in being the first to sell a consumer product around the 
world, reaching the Russian ‘nouveaux riche’, Danish and Dutch young urban professionals looking for 
‘value for money’, UK families substituting French for Australian and Chilean wines, etc. This first contact 
is key, and justifies, in my view, a public interest in most of the issues raised above by the respondents to 
our interview (from the 7th up to the 14th issue). This could take the form of legislative adjustments enabling 
certain collaborative efforts, e.g. to create (private) funds for basic research or applied R&D. 
Above, we develop a plea for a more active government and for public policies to be more sensitive, 
flexible, specific and above all more embedded in cluster developments. This would reverse a long-term 
trend in Latin America of national, static and even bureaucratic policies that give rise to public suspicion 
regarding their legitimacy and effectiveness, at a moment when public-private trust and co-operation is 
crucial to prevent the stagnation of (potential) clusters. The main justification for a more active public role 
is that such can boost the competitiveness of industries, foreign investment in these industries, and the 
socio-economic impact of these industries. The main risk, however, is that government failure replaces or, 
worse even, adds to cluster (system) and market failures—a repetition of history. In this regard, we refer to 
Nooteboom’s (1999, p. 803) advice to the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs to “limit itself to the (legal) 
enabling and facilitation of the role of cluster brokers to be played by others, and then focus on the 
monitoring and control of possible misuses in the form of exclusion of outsiders and corruption”. Here, 
Nooteboom refers to the roles of so-called go-between’s, i.e., third parties whose roles are to reduce 
transaction costs in the case of relatively small and infrequent transactions, to serve as a guardian of 
hostages, to yield information on the competence of partners in collaborative projects, to reveal 
opportunistic behavior and build intentional trust, to connect networks once appropriate, and to help to 
disentangle networks once required, mediating opposition of dependent parties, enabling other parties to 
get away with maximum damage control (1999, pp. 801-803). 
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VI.  Conclusion 
The Chilean wine industry performed remarkably well over the 
past decades. The effective turnaround from a domestic towards an 
export market focus is impressive. Foreign investors have been 
important in the process of technological upgrading and updating, and 
the subsequent internationalization of the industry. New entrants in the 
1990s also served to dynamize the industry, not only by enhancing 
rivalry but above all by triggering social, attitudal and strategic change 
in the industry. Collective actions are incipient in the industry; their 
coordination on the basis of effective local cluster governance has not 
played a significant role in boosting the industry’s performance so far.  
However, the issue of local governance is increasingly 
important, as the agenda for urgent collective actions and investments 
is expanding quickly, while the quality of local governance is 
insufficient to deal with the coordination problems they entail. This is 
the key problem to be solved by the industry, if it wants to continue 
growing. The backbone for stepping up co-operation and effective 
coordination of collective actions in the industry could be the 
improvement of the relation between two business associations: Viñas 
de Chile and Chilevid, which currently co-operate in launching the 
Promotora Wines of Chile. In the slipstream of this co-operation, large 
firms should align their role in the industry, turning into real leader 
firms. Next, the three university research institutes and CCV could 
continue working together to coordinate and integrate R&D, training 
and educations efforts, at various levels of the labor force, with a short 
and long-term focus on industry development. All these actors have 
unique  perspectives  and  contributions to make  to a shared vision for  
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the development of the Chilean wine industry, based on a cluster perspective, strategic awareness 
(including the distinction between private and social interests and short and long-term effects of 
joint  ction and collective investments), leadership, and—a requirement to achieve any shared goal: 
an effective system of local cluster governance. Finally, there is scope for the Chilean 
government—through various public institutes, to play a role in the development of the Chilean 
wine cluster, with positive effects for other natural-resource based clusters and export industries. A 
transition towards cluster-embedded policies is possible and required, and can best occur along the 
lines of (legal) enabling, facilitating, monitoring and controlling third parties (‘go-betweens’) 
playing several roles in making clusters work for investment and innovation-based development. 
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ANNEX 1 
 WINE PRODUCING REGIONS AND VALLEYS IN CHILE 
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ANNEX 3 
 LIST OF RESPONDENTS 
Organization Name Position 
Nuevos Mundos (information broker) Mr. Ramón Rada General Manager 
Chilevid (association) Mr. Rodrigo Alvarado Moore General Manager 
Wine R&D center of the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile (CEVIUC) 
M. Alvaro S. González R. General Manager 
Viña Anakena (winemaker) Mr.Jorge Gutiérrez Pubil General Manager 
Viña Willian Févre Chile (winemaker, JV) Mr. Cyril Chaplot Sales Manager 
CORFO (State Institution) Mr. Andrés Parker Director 
Viñas de Chile (Association) Mr. Matías Elton Vice President (General 
Manager Viña San 
Pedro) 
Corporación Chilena del Vino (Association) Mr. Ricardo Zilleruelo 
Hozven 
General Manager 
Viña Montes (Winemaker) Mr. Carlos Serrano Export  Manager 
SAG (State Institution) Mr. Antonio Aluanlly Agricultural engineer 
and oenologists 
Viña Casa Lapostolle (Winemaker, JV) Mr. José Manuel Roger General Manager 
Agro industrial and enology department of the 
University of Chile 
Mr. Eduardo Loyola Full Professor in 
Oenology 
PROCHILE (State Institution) Mrs. Paula Vasquez Productor Manager 
Rabobank, head Office Utrecht 
 
Rabobank, Chile 
Mr. Arend M.A. Heijbroek 
 
Mr. Mauricio Rojas 
Industry Specialist Wine 
and Spirits 
Senior Credit Officer 
Wine R&D Centre of the University of Talca Mr. Yerko Moreno Director 
Asociación Ingenieros Agronómos y Enólogos 
(professional association) 
Mr. Victor Costa Barros President 
Viña Echeverría Limitada (Winemaker) Mr. Roberto Echeverría 
(father) 
General Manager 
Cameo Marinetti S.A. (Suplier) Mr. Aldo González General Manager 
Cristalerías Chile (Suplier) Mr. Danilo Jordán Franulic Export Manager 
Viña Cousiño Macul (Winemaker, large firm) Mr. Colin Rogers General Manager 
Promotora Wines of Chile (Joint action) Mr. Ricardo Letelier General Manager 
Chilevid (Association) Mr. Alejandro Hernández President 
Ruta del vino del valle de Casablanca (regional 
association) 
Mr. Pedro Montesinos General Manager 
Ruta del vino del valle de Colchagua (Regional 
association) 
Mr. Thomas Wilkins General Manager 
Viña Selentia (Winemaker) Mr. Juan Pablo Heinsohn S. General Manager 
Viña Santa Rita (Winemaker, large firm) Mr. Anibal Ariztía Reyes General Manager 
Embassy of Chile in London Mr. Mariano Fernández A. Ambassador 
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R&D: 1 public, 3 
academic centres 
Training: MSc in 
oenology at 3 
universities 
Associations: 
Viñas de Chile, 























































None  Transport costs ↓ Local, external and 
static effect, that is 
due to the one-time 
location decisions of 
firms. Each firm in 
the area benefits. 
Passive attitude of 
entrepreneurs: 




















Spatial proximity to a location 
factor and/or between firms; 
a high density of economic 
activity; a local history of 
specialization in a set of 
related activities; many,  
often small, independent 

















of experience, scale 
and scope induce a 
pool of skilled labor, 
and boost the supply 
of business 
information, producer 
and public services. 
Market exchange of 
products and spillover 
of information favor 
producers, tying the 
latter to the local area 
Transport costs ↓ 
 
Transformation costs 
(labor productivity ↑) 
 
Transaction costs ↓ 
(purely search costs) 
Local, external and 
internal, and mostly 
static effects, due to 
location decisions of 
firms,  market 
interactions and 
spillovers. Each firm 
in the area benefits. 
Passive attitude of 
entrepreneurs: 
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Structural features Nature Direction 
Localization 
process 
















Spatial proximity of 
specialized firms; inter-firm 
division of labor 
(specialization and 
outsourcing); semi-
hierarchical governance in 
one-firm led complexes, and 


























of firms. Sunk 
costs and specific 
investments 
prevent firms to 
relocate. 
Transport and 
logistic costs ↓ 
Transformation costs 
↓ (multiple causes) 





In one-firm led 
complexes, 
economies are 
internalized by the 
larger lead firm. 
Suppliers are 
required to locate 
nearby (enhancing 
site specificity). The 
lead firm actively 
creates JIT and 
TQM systems. 






evenly spread over 
firms, perhaps 
more static (cost-
based), as there is 
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As above (in local markets 
and complexes) 




private partnerships; social 
ties, shared norms and 
values, mutual identification 
and empathy;  repeated 
transactions, competence 
trust; spin-offs, start-ups and 

































advantage of certain 
locations (settings) 
is due to a specific 




As above (local 
markets and 
complexes).  
Transaction cost ↓, 




1st order learning ↑ 
(Maskell’s 
evolutionary selection 







2nd order effects of 
learning-by-




internal, static and 
dynamic, due to a 










whose successes in 
networks feed back 
to the cluster. 
Renewal of the 
cluster’s knowledge 
base, and another 
phase of positive 
externalities, to 





time this may 
change due to 
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As above (local networks).  
Co-evolution between local 
institutions, networks, (capital, 
labor and product) markets, and 
policies; responsive and smart 
government implementing 
cluster, place and phase-specific 
policies; flexibility regarding 
specialist positions in teams, 
variety of organizational forms in 
and beyond the cluster, and 
combination of ‘buzz’ and 
‘pipelines’ (internal and external 
knowledge); ongoing renewal of 












As above (local 
networks). 
Localization also based 
on competence effects 
of an open yet regional 
learning system 
As above (local 
networks).  
Sustained 2nd order 
learning ↑, due to 
flexibility regarding 
positions in teams, 
variety of organizational 
forms in and beyond the 
cluster, and combination 
of ‘buzz’ and ‘pipelines’ 
(internal and external 
knowledge processes) 
Know-whom as 
important as know-what 
or know-how. Sufficient 
cognitive distance for P 
[novelty] ↑ 
Multiple effects: 
external and internal, 
static and dynamic, 
due to a variety of 
factors and behaviors 
(see above, local 
network), as well as 
changes due to co-




other actors, whose 
successes in 
networks, PPPs or 
global pipelines feed 
back to the cluster. 




distribution of cluster 
benefits are likely, 
although through time 
this may change due 
to structural change. 
Sources: Visser 1996, 1999, 2000a en b; Maskell 2001; Atzema and Visser 2002; Boschma and Lambooy 2002; Visser and Boschma 2003; van Dijk en Sverrisson 2003; Schmitz and 
Nadvi 1999; Capello 1999; Asheim 2002; Herrigel 2000, among others.   6th column: vertical relations between producers in a value chain; horizontal relations between producers making 
the same product (competitors); lateral relations between producers making complementary products but belonging to the same branch; diagonal relations between producers in a 
branch and entrepreneurs in other branches, often services, but also manufacturing.  9th column: static effects relate to efficiency and costs; dynamic effects refer to learning and 
organization. Economies can be external to the firm (public) or internal (available to one firm only). Distribution of effects: internalized by one or just a few firms (clans) versus external, 
decentralized, accessible to (m)any firm(s). Geographical scope of (mostly external) effects: locally concentrated or spreading over larger distances. Attitude of entrepreneurs: they may 
passively enjoy clustering benefits or actively pursue competitive advantage, e.g. through networking or investments with positive external effects for the cluster or networks in the cluster
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